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AComparison of Tournaments and Contracts
ABS TRACT
Tournaments, reward structures based on rank order, are compared with
individual contracts in a model with one risk—neutral principal and many
risk—averse agents. Each agents's output is a stochastic function of his
effort level plus an additive shock term that is common to all the agents.
The principal observes only the output levels of the agents. It is shown
that in the absence of a common shock, using optimal independent contracts
dominates using the optimal tournament. Conversely, if the distribution
of the common shock is sufficiently diffuse, using the optimal tournament
dominates using optimal independent contracts. Finally, it is shown that
for a sufficiently large number of agents, a principal who cannot observe
the common shock but uses the optimal tournament, does as well as one who













At the Olympics prizes are awarded not on the basis of absolute
performance, but rather on the basis of relative performance. Similarly, in
most organizations one of the most important rewards is promotion. If the
hierarchical structure of the organization is fixed, employees at any one
echelon are competing for a fixed, smaller number of positions at the next
higher echelon. The goal for these employees is not just to do well, but to
do better than their peers.
The existing literature on incentives and contract design has been
concerned primarily with the case where a principal employs only one agent,
and rewards him on the basis of absolute performance. Exceptions include two
recent papers about tournaments——reward structures based on rank order, and
one that considers more general compensation schemes for iailti—agent settings.
The first is by Lazear and Rosen [1981], who examine the problem of a
risk—neutral firm with two employees. The output of each agent depends
stochastically on his owneffortand on an additive shock that is common to
both. The agents do not know the value of the common shock at the time they
choose their effort levels; they do know its distribution. It is shown that
if the agents are risk—neutral, an optimal two—person tournament is
equivalent, for all three parties, to offering the optimal incentive contract
to each agent independently. In either case, because the agents are risk—
neutral, the moral hazard problem can be avoided costlessly by shifting all
risk onto the agents. Lazear and Rosen also compare linear piece rates and
tournaments for the case of risk—averse agents and a normally distributed
shock. They show thatifthe variance of the shock term is sufficiently
large, the optImal tournament yields higher expected utilities.
Stiglitz [19811 compares tournaments and independent contracts using a—2—
somewhat different specification of the production technology. Here the shock
is nultiplicative, so that it affects the marginal product of labor. A wide
variety of cases and examples are studied.
Finally, Holmstrom [1981] examines arbitrary relative performance schemes
for risk—averse agents. He shows that for either additive or multiplicative
shocks, because the mean output level is a sufficient statistic for all of the
information about the common shock, optimal contracts can be designed in which
each agent's reward depends only on his own output level and on the mean
output level.
In all of these models, compensation schemes that base an agent's reward
on the performance of his peers as well as his own, take advantage of the fact
that the vector of output levels for the whole group is a source of
information about the common shock——which by assumption the principal cannot
observe directly. Optimal compensation schemes for groups of agentscan, in
general, have arbitrary and complicated functional forms——depending on
assumptions about tastes, technology, and distributions for the error terms.
In practise, on the other hand, rather simple schemes are often used.
Consequently, it is useful to study the properties of simple schemes——to
understand when they perform "almost" as well as "optimal contracts. That is
the viewpoint adopted here, where we compare the efficiency of independent
contracts and tournaments. Under the former each agent's reward depends only
on his own output level, while under the latter it depends only on his rank
order. These represent the extreme cases of reward structures based on
absolute and relative performance.
We consider a situation in which one risk—neutral principal employs a
group of identical risk—averse agents. As in the Lazear—Rosen model, each
agent's output is assumed to depend stochastically on his own effort and a—3—
common additive shock term. The common shock might represent economic
conditions which affect all of the agents. We allow agents to observe private
signals, correlated with this common shock, before they choose their effort
levels. The realized output of each agent then is a stochastic function of
his effort and the value of the common shock. The principal observes only the
output levels of the agents.
We assume throughout that the principal is constrained to offer a fixed
minimum level of expected itility to each agent, so that we can judge the
relative performance of contracts and tournaments by examining the expected
payoff of the principal. The principal's objective function is the sum of the
outputs of all the agents minus the sum of the rewards paid to all of them.
We show that for any finite number of agents, in the absence of a common
error term, using the optimal tournament is dominated by using optimal
independent contracts. In the absence of a common shock, the output levels of
the rest of the group convey no information about the effort level of an
agent. Using a tournament in this case only introduces extraneous noise into
the payoff function that agent faces. Since the agents are risk—averse, this
is costly for the principal.
Conversely, given any group of at least two agents, if the distribution
of the common error term is sufficiently diffuse, then the optimal tournament
dominates using optimal independent contracts. In this case using tournaments
eliminates a major source of noise, while adding a relatively minor one.
Finally, given any fixed distribution for the common error term, for a
sufficiently large number of agents, using the optimal tournament dominates
using optimal independent contracts. In fact, if the number of agents is
sufficiently large, a principal who cannot observe the value of the common
shock and uses an optimal tournament can do as well as a principal who can—4—
observe the value of the shock and uses general, interdependent contracts.
For a large enough group of agents, an agent's rank order is an extremely
accurate signal about his output level net of the common additive shock.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 tastes,
technology, distributions, and feasible sets of tournaments and contracts are
described; in Section 3 tournaments and independent contracts are compared;
and in Section 4 the conclusions are discussed.
2. The Model
We consider the problem faced by a principal who employs a fixed group of
agents, i —1,.,n.The agents are all identical ex ante. The preferences of
each agent i over his income, m1, and his effort, x1, are represented by the
von Neumann—Morgenstern utility function
U1(mj,x1) =u(mj)
—
x1,m1) 0, Xi )0,1 1,...,n; (1)
where u: R+ +[0,B]is strictly increasing and strictly concave.'
The output of agent 1, y1, depends stochastically on his effort level,
x1. In particular,
—+n, (2)
where ncR is a random variable affecting all of the agents, and zi is a
random variable whose distribution depends on x1. Let F( ;x1) denote the
conditional distribution function for Zj given x1; since the agents are
identical ex ante, F does not depend on i. Assume thatforany effort level x
) 0, the distribution function for output, F( ;x) has a continuous density—5—
function f( ;x) which is positive everywhere and continuously differentiable
in x.
The agents observe private signals about n before choosing their effort
levels; let a1 c R denote the signal observed by agent 1, and let C denote the
distribution function for (n,a). Note that this formulation includes
situations where all agents observe the same signal, independent signals,
signals that reveal 11completely,and signals that are uncorrelated with n.
Assume that Zjand(n,a) are independent, and assume that r has zero mean.
fndG(r,a) 0 (3)
(Except where otherwise indicated, integration is over the entire range.)
The principal's problem is to design a reward structure for the n
agents. The principal is risk—neutral and seeks to maximize the expected sum
of the outputs net of total payments to the agents.
E[ (y1 -mi)] (4)
1—1
By assumption the principal observes only the output levels of the
agents, y he cannot directly observe either the agents'
effort levels or the realization of any random variable. Under independent
contracts agent i's reward depends only on his ownoutputlevel, Yj' while
under a tournament it depends only on the rank order ofy1 in y.
Given any reward structure, the problem facing each agent is to choose a
level of effort. First consider the situation under independent contracts.
Since the agents are identical, we can consider the problem facing a
representative agent 1.It is convenient to think of the principal as—6—
constructing the reward function in termsofutility. For any reward fnction
R(y), let v(y) be defined as its representation in utility terms, v(y)u(R(y)).
The cost to the principal of providing this level of utility is then given by
y(v(y)), where y u. Since u is strictly increasing and strictly concave,
y is strictly increasing and strictly convex. Agent i observes and then
chooses the level of effort that maximizes his expected utility. Since the
optimal level of effort will depend on the value of ci, the optimal decision
rule for the agent is a function X(ai).
The principal's problem is to choose (v,X) to maximize (4) subject to the
two constraints that X be an optimal decision rule for the agent given v, and
that the expected utility of the agent be at least u0. Given G, define Si(G)
to be the set of contracts that are feasible for the ith agent:
Si(G){(v,X)I v:R+ +[O,B],X:R +R+;
X(a1) c argmax f v(y)f f(y—ri;x)dG(rI,aiIa)dy —x,v (5a)
ff (v(y) —X(a))f(y—n;X(a))dG(n,a)dy
)u°}; (5b)
and define Pi(v,X,G) to be the expected payoff of the principal from the
contract (v,X):
Pj(v,X,G)ff (y —y(v(y))f(y—rx(a1))dydc(,a).
The feasible set is always non—empty, since it always contains the "no—
incentive contract: (v u0,X0) c Si(G), for all G,i. Note that the
expectedpayoff to the principal under this contract, call itP°, is
independentof C.—7—
P0
Pi(v°,X°,G) ff (z + n —y(u°))f(z;O)dzdc(n,a)
=fzf(z;O)dz —1(u°)
Next consider the situation under a tournament. As above it is
convenient to express rewards in terms of utility. In an n—person tournament
with prizes (W1,W2,...,w), define w =(w1,w2,...,w)by w u(W1), Vi.
(We use the numbering conventional In the study of order statistics: "first
place" Is the lowest outcome, and w1 is the prize received by the agent with
the lowest output, etc.) We will consider symmetric Nash equilibria of the
game in which each agent's strategy is his effort level.2





Thatis, the rank order of the outputs depends only on the zj's and on r.
Therefore, the realization of (i,a) does not affect the game played by the
agents, and the equilibrium effort level will be Independent of a. Hence we
can analyze the game in terms just of the z1's. In an n—person tournament,
agent I wins prize w if and only if zi Is the jth order statistic of
(z1,...,z). Define:
•j(z;x)= (fl_j)!(j_l)!z;x)F(z;x)(1_F(z;x))i
That is, •j(z;x) Is the density function for the jth order statistic in a
sample of size n drawn from the distribution F( ;x).—8—
As above, the principal is constrained to offer the agents an expected
utility of at least u°. We are interested only in tournaments that have
symmetric Nash equilibria. Given n and G, the set of feasible n—person
tournaments, ST(n,C), is defined by:
ST(n,G){(w,)Iw c [O,BJ', x e R+;
n — 1r rf(z;x) —
xc argmax —L w4j —•.(z;x)dz —x; (6a)
x j1
'f(z;x) "
in 0 —w—x)u} , (6b)
n
Note that ST(n,G) =ST(n),for all G satisfying (3).
Given n, G, and (w,) c ST(n), let PT(n,w,x,G) denote the principal's





Hence PT(n,w,x,G)Pr(n,w,x). We summarize these results in Lemma i.
Lemma 1: The set of feasible tournaments, the expected payoff of the principal
under any feasible tournament, and hence the optimal tournament, each depend
on the number of players ii, and on the distribution function F, but not on
the distribution function C.
Lemma 1 is interesting in its own right, since it says that tournaments are
robust against lack of information or lack of agreement about G. It will also—9—
beuseful for our later results. Note that the set of feasible tournaments is
always non—empty, since it always contains the "no—incentive" tournament:
£ST(n),for all n. The payoff per agent to the principal
under this tournament is P°.
3. Comparisonof Tournaments andContracts
Firstwewill show that for any number of agents n and any function F





then for any feasible tournament there exists a feasible contract that
dominates It.3 Note that if G satisfies (7), then it also satisfies (3).
Proposition 1: For any F, G satisfying (7), and n )2,given
(w,) £ST(n),there exists (v,X) c Scj(G) I1,...,n, such that:
Pj(v,X,C) ) PT(n,w,x), I =1,...,n.
The inequality is strict unless (w,) =
Proof:Let F, C, n2, and (w,) c ST(n) be given. We will show that the




X(a1)x , forall a1;— 10—
satisfiesthe required conditions.
First we will show that the proposed contract satisfies (5a) and (5b).




= argmaxf-- w. —f(z;x)dz—x,forall a1.
x j=1 f(z;x)
Since (w,) satisfies (6a), X(oi) x and (5a) is satisfied.
Moreover, since (w,) satisfies (6b), the expected utility of the agent
under v is given by:
fv(z)f(z;)dz—
n '(z;x) rl r jn — — 0 = L —w4f(z;x)dz
—x ) u
j=1f(z,x)
Hence (5b) is also satisfied.










> fzf(z,x)dz — y(w4)f•4(z,x)dz
j=1 JI— 11—
— PT(n,w,x)
The inequality follows from Jensen's inequality and the fact thaty is
strictly convex. If w #' (w,...,), the inequality is strict. If
w (w,..,), then x —0,and unless—u0,the contract (vu0, x0)
dominates (w,). Q.E.D.
An obvious corollary of Proposition 1 is that when there isno common
error term, the optimal contract dominates the optimal tournament.








The inequality is strict unless (v u0,X0) maximizes the left—hand side.
Next, we will compare independent contracts and tournaments as thecommon
error term becomes diffuse. We will consider sequences {G }suchthat for k k=1
all k:
G1 satisfies (2);
Ck has a density function g; (8)
f(n-.1Ia1)da1g(nIa1)< 1/k, for all
In Proposition 2 we show that for anysequence {Ck} satisfying (8), for
all k sufficiently large, the optimal contract is the "no—incentive"contract— 12—
(vu0, X 0). Hence the principal's expected payoff under the optimal
contract falls to P° along the sequence. However, as shown above, the optimal
tournament and the principal's expected payoff under it——which is at least P°,
will be unchanged along the sequence.
Proposition 2: Let F, {Gk)l satisying (8), and n > 2, be given. Assume
that fx(z;x) Is a function of bounded variation in z, for all x )0,and that
the bound, N, is uniform in x. Then there exists K such that for all k > K:
_Max PT(w,x,n) Max P j(v,X,Gk), i =1,...,n. (9)
(w,x)CST(n) (v,X)cSci(Gk)
C
Theinequality is strict unless the lefthand side is equal to P°.
Proof: Let {(v1,X1)} be a sequence of optimal contracts for agent I. Note
that:
> 0 =>1 = f v(y)ff(y—
ruX1(a1))g1(nIa1)dndy.(10)





Since v(y) £[O,B], for all y, (10)
:8rn0t
hold.Hence for k sufficiently
large (Vkj u 0), and Pc(vkj,Xkj,Gk) —"
ByLemma 1, ST and T are independent of C, so that the left hand side of
(9) is at least P° and is constant along the sequence {Ck}. Q.E.D.
Ourfinalresult concerns the relative efficiency of tournaments and— 13—
contractsas the number of agents grows. We will consider sequences of
distributions {G (n,a1,...,cl such that the marginal distribution
function for i is unchanged throughout.
fdG(flO)(ri) ,forall n =2,3,..... (11)
We will show that as n +, notonly does the optimal tournament dominate the
optimal contract, but in fact the optimal tournament approaches the full—
information solution. That is, as n +theprincipal does as well as if he
could observedirectly. There are two steps in the proof.
In Lenuna 2 we show that any contract for which the payoff function is
piecewise continuous and the agent's optimal effort level is unique, can be
approximated arbitrarily closely by a payoff function that is a step
function. Then in Lemma 3 we show that each of these step function contracts
can be approximated arbitrarily closely by tournament with a sufficiently
large number of players.
Let C satisfying (7) be given. As noted above, when C satisfies (7) we
can restrict attention to contracts (v,X) for which X(ai) is a constant
function. For these contracts Sci —Scand ci =forall i.First we
will show that given any feasible contract (v,X), we can construct asequence
of contracts {(vk,k)}1 such thatvk is a step function with k steps, XK is
a constant function, and vk +Vin measure.
Let (v(y)) t S(G) be given, and let'kl'•••"kk' be intervals
corresponding to quantiles of the distribution F( ;):
'kj{zj—1)/k < F(z;) ( j/k},j i,...,k; k —1,2,3,....(12)
Let be the expected payoff of the agent under (v,) on each of—14 —
theseintervals:
Vk fv(z)f(z;)dz, 1,...,k; k 1,2,... (13)
jI.
kj
Next, define the step function Vk(Z) by:
'kj
==>;k(z)Vkj
for all z,k; (14)
as shown in Figure 1. Note that as k +, vk(z)+v(z)In measure. Finally,
define:
arginax fVk(Z)f(Z;X)dZ
, forall k; (15)
Ck -U+ Xk —J•;k(z)f(z;Xk)dz
,forall k; (16)
vk(z);k(Z) + CK , forall z,k. (17)
Note that by construction, for C satisfying (7), (v,) S(G), for all k.
Lemma 2: Let F, C satisfying (7) and (v,) S(G) be given. If v is
piecewise continuous and If X is the unique solution of:
Max fv(z)f(z;x)dz—x, (18)
x
then for the sequence {(Vk,)}1 defined by (12)(17),
lim Pc(vk,Xk,G)P(v,X,G).— 15—
andfor k sufficiently large, is the unique solution of:
Max ffvk(y)f(y
—r;x)dG(n)dy—x
Proof: Since f( ;x) is continuous in x, Vk +vin measure, and X is the
unique maximizer of (18), from (15) it follows that Xk ÷X.Hence




so that the desired conclusion follows immediately. Q.E.D.
Next, we will show that for G satisfying (7), given any contract
(v,) S(G), where v is a step function, and X is a constant function, we
can construct a sequence of tournaments that approximate it. Define Yni by
F(y; X)i/(n+1), as shown in Figure 2, and define w by:
w1 v(yi). (19)
Then where it exists define:
n (z;x) — r 1r in n =argmaxj f(z;x) w1 —dz—x; (20)
x i=1 f(z;x)
and let:
n a u°+X_! W,(21) n n n1ni
i1,...,n. (22)— 16—
Lena3:LetF, C satisfying (7), and (v,) c S(G) be given, where v is a
step function, X is a constant function, and X is the unique solution of
(18). Let {(w")}1 and {(w,)}1 be the sequences defined by (19)—
(22). For n sufficiently large, x as defined by (20) exists and
(w,) CST(n). Moreover,
urn PT(n,w,) =P(v,,G), (23)
Proof: Consider a representative player j in an n—person tournament with
prizes w. Suppose that the n—i other players all adopt the effort level X,
and consider the conditional distribution of prizes for player j, given that
his observed output is Yj. UnlessYj is a point of discontinuity in the step
function v, as the number of players increases, by the law of large numbers
the conditional probability that j has a rank order such that his prize is
equal to v(yj) approaches one. That is:
lim wji(z;)/f(z;) =v(z;),foralmost all z. n- i1
Since X is the unique solution of (18), for n sufficiently large,x1 as
defined by (20) exists, and urn X. Thus (23) follows immediately.
Q.E.D.
As a reference point, we want to define the optimalcontract and expected
payofffor a principal who can obseve n.If the principal can observe n
directly, the optimal contract (v*,X*) is independent of C, and has the form:
v(y,n)v*(y n),forall y,n;— 17—
X(r)X, forall ii;
The principal's expected payoff in this case is given by:
* * *
P f(z—v(z))f(z;X )dz
Moreover, note that for any G° satisfying (7):
(v*,X*) =argmaxP(v,X,G°)
(v, X)cS(G°)
Proposition3: Let F, and {G}2 satisfying (3) and (11) be given, and let
(v*,X*) and * be as defined above. Then,
urn _MaxPT(n,w,)
=p* Max P(v,X,G) . (24)
(w,x)CST(n) (v,X)eS(G)
The inequality is strict unless C defined in (11) satisfies (7)or P =pO•
Proof: Let {(vk,xk))1 be the sequenceofcontracts defined for (v*,X*) by
(12)—(17), and for each k =1,2,...,let{(w,)} be the sequence of
tournaments defined by (19)—(22). ByLemma2, for any G satisfying (7):
urnPc(vk,Xk,G) —p*
andby Lemma 3,
lirn PT(wk,,n) PC(vk,X.K,C).— 18—
Sinceby Lemma1, PT(w,x,n)is independent of C,




However, unless G() satisfies (7) or p*P°, the righthand side of (24) is
strictly less than P (Holmstrorn [1979], Corollary 2). Q.E.D.
4.Conclusions
In the model above, all agents' output levels are subject to the same
random shock. Thus, the output levels of the group provide the principal with
information about the value of the common shock, and consequently about the
portion of any particular agent's output that is attributable to effort.
Relative performance schemes——of which tournaments are an extreme form——allow
the principal to make use of this information.
Obviously tournaments employ available information in a rather
inefficient and inflexible way. In the model above, tournaments tend to
reduce the randomness of any agent's compensation by filtering out the common
shock term. However, they also tend to increase the randomness in any agent's
compensation by making his reward depend on the idiosyncratic shocks of his
peers. Proposition 1 and 2 show that the relative advantage of tournaments
vis a vis contracts depends on which effect dominates.
Despite the fact that a tournament makes inefficient use of information,
Proposition 3 shows that this entails no loss if the number of agents is
sufficiently large. In large groups, the rank order of an agent's observed
output is a very accurate esimator of his output net of the common shock.
Tournaments are not, in general, "optimal" contracts. Why then are
rankings so commonly used as an evaluation criterion? First, it may be— 19—
substantiallyeasier to determine agents' rankings than to measure their
output levels. In addition, as shown in Lemma 1 neither the set of feasible
tournaments nor the optimal tournament depends on the distribution function
f or the common shock and agents' signals. This is an obvious advantage if
that distribution is unknown or imprecisely known——as it would be, for
example, in nonstationary environments. Since in large group the inefficiency























1 F (y— 22—
FOOThO1ES
'Thefact that "effort enters linearly into each agent's utility function
involves no loss of generality. Since "effort" is never aggregated across
agents, units of effort are simply defined as whatever causes units of
disutility to the agent. Under this units convention P reflects both the
concavity of the agent's utility function in "hours" (or some other standard
unit of measurement), as well as the concavity of the production function in
"hours." If at least one of these functions is strictly concave, then (3)
holds. The agent's utility of income is bounded to avoid problems of the type
discussed by Mirrlees [19751.
2For arbitrary prize structures, there may be no Nash equilibrium——
symmetric or otherwise. This is of no importance to us, since we are
considering only tournaments that are designed so that they do have a
symmetric Nash equilibrium. The restriction to tournaments with symmetric
equilibria is purely on the grounds of tractability.
3This result is (almost) a special case of Theorem 10 in Holmstrom
[19811. (In Holmstrom's model agents do not have access to any information
about the common shock.) Proposition 1 is included here for the sake of
completeness.— 23—
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